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MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 2
EXPANDING AGENCY AUTHORITY: ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES MAY INTERPRET ISSUES OF THEIR OWN
JURISDICTIONS AND ASSESS PENALTIES AGAINST
ASBESTOS DISPOSAL SITES DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR
OFFENSES
Lyon County Bd of Comm'rs v. U.S. EPA'
I. INTRODUCTION

When the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") determined
that a landfill had mishandled asbestos on its site in violation of the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), the EPA assessed penalties against the county in which
the landfill was located.2 The landfill appealed the penalty on several
grounds. 3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined, among other
things, that the EPA had the authority to assess penalties against the
landfill, and the penalty amount was proper.4
This note argues that the Eighth Circuit was too lenient in allowing
the EPA to penalize the landfill because in so doing, it permitted the
agency to determine the scope of its own authority. Deferring to agencies'
interpretations of their own jurisdictions leads to an array of administrative
problems, as well as broader societal problems. This note also argues that
the penalty imposed on the county was excessive because it was out of
proportion with the landfill's offense. The court's holding exposes
asbestos disposal sites to limitless liability, thereby decreasing incentive to
develop and maintain such sites.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

On July 20, 1994, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
("MPCA") began an asbestos compliance inspection of the Lyon County
Landfill, located in Lynd, Minnesota.5 MPCA investigators noticed ripped
2

4

Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States EPA, 406 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 982-83.
Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 982.
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plastic bags with asbestos warning labels at the landfill site. 6 The next
day, investigators returned to the landfill site and discovered even more
ripped plastic bags with asbestos warning labels. There were visible
asbestos emissions coming from the plastic bags.8 The inspectors took
photographs and samples from the bags and surrounding area, which were
found to contain between five and thirty-five percent asbestos.
The MPCA notified the EPA of its observations at the landfill.' 0
After unsuccessful negotiations with Lyon County, the EPA filed an
administrative complaint." . The EPA's complaint alleged that Lyon
6

Id.

Id.
Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. Before referring the case to the EPA for enforcement, the MPCA attempted to negotiate a
settlement with Lyon County. Id.
" Id. The EPA filed the administrative complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1), which
provides,
(1) The Administrator may issue an administrative order against any person
assessing a civil administrative penalty of up to $25,000, per day of violation,
whenever, on the basis of any available information, the Administrator finds
that such person
(A) has violated or is violating any requirement or prohibition of an applicable
implementation plan (such order shall be issued (i) during any period of
federally assumed enforcement, or (ii) more than thirty days following the date
of the Administrator's notification under subsection (a)(1) of this section of a
finding that such person has violated or is violating such requirement or
prohibition); or
(B) has violated or is violating any other requirement or prohibition of this
subchapter or subchapter III, IV-A, V, or VI of this chapter, including, but not
limited to, a requirement or prohibition of any rule, order, waiver, permit, or
plan promulgated, issued, or approved under this chapter, or for the payment of
any fee owed the United States under this chapter (other than subchapter II of
this chapter); or
(C) attempts to construct or modify a major stationary source in any area with
respect to which a finding under subsection (a)(5) of this section has been
made.
The Administrator's authority under this paragraph shall be limited to matters
where the total penalty sought does not exceed $200,000 and the first alleged
date of violation occurred no more than 12 months prior to the initiation of the
administrative action, except where the Administrator and the Attorney General
jointly determine that a matter involving a larger penalty amount or longer
period of violation is appropriate for administrative penalty action. Any such
determination by the Administrator and the Attorney General shall not be
subject to judicial review.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2005).
8
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County violated 40 C.F.R. § 61.15412 by not preventing visible asbestos
40 C.F.R. § 61.154 provides, in pertinent
part,
Each owner or operator of an active waste disposal site that receives asbestoscontaining waste material from a source covered under § § 61.149, 61.150, or
61.155 shall meet the requirements of this section:
(a) Either there must be no visible emissions to the outside air from any active
waste disposal site where asbestos-containing waste material has been
deposited, or the requirements of paragraph (c) or (d) of this section must be
met.
(subsection b omitted)
(c) Rather than meet the no visible emission requirement of paragraph (a) of
this section, at the end of each operating day, or at least once every 24-hour period while
the site is in continuous operation, the asbestos-containing waste material that has been
deposited at the site during the operating day or previous 24-hour period shall:
(1) Be covered with at least 15 centimeters (6 inches) of compacted nonasbestos-containing material, or
(2) Be covered with a resinous or petroleum-based dust suppression agent that
effectively binds dust and controls wind erosion. Such an agent shall be used in the
manner and frequency recommended for the particular dust by the dust suppression agent
manufacturer to achieve and maintain dust control. Other equally effective dust
suppression agents may be used upon prior approval by the Administrator. For purposes
of this paragraph, any used, spent, or other waste oil is not considered a dust suppression
agent.
(d) Rather than meet the no visible emission requirement of paragraph (a) of
this section, use an alternative emissions control method that has received prior written
approval by the Administrator according to the procedures described in § 61.149(c)(2).
(e) For all asbestos-containing waste material received, the owner or operator
of the active waste disposal site shall:
(1) Maintain waste shipment records, using a form similar to that shown in
Figure 4,....
(2) As soon as possible and no longer than 30 days after receipt of the waste,
send a copy of the signed waste shipment record to the waste generator.
(3) Upon discovering a discrepancy between the quantity of waste designated
on the waste shipment records and the quantity actually received, attempt to reconcile the
discrepancy with the waste generator. If the discrepancy is not resolved within 15 days
after receiving the waste, immediately report in writing to the local, State, or EPA
Regional office responsible for administering the asbestos NESHAP program for the
waste generator (identified in the waste shipment record), and, if different, the local,
State, or EPA Regional office responsible for administering the asbestos NESHAP
program for the disposal site. Describe the discrepancy and attempts to reconcile it, and
submit a copy of the waste shipment record along with the report.
(subsection 4 omitted)
(f) Maintain, until closure, records of the location, depth and area, and quantity
in cubic meters (cubic yards) of asbestos-containing waste material within the disposal
site on a map or diagram of the disposal area.
(subsections g & h omitted)
(j) Notify the Administrator in writing at least 45 days prior to excavating or
12
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emissions or taking alternate measures to control emissions, not
maintaining comprehensive shipment records detailing the location, depth,
and quantity of the material, and not notifying the EPA in advance of the
excavation or disturbance of asbestos-containing waste material
("ACWM").' 3 The EPA sought a civil penalty in the amount of

$58,000.00.14
The Administrative Law Judge ("AL") found Lyon County liable
on all counts and imposed a $45,000.00 penalty.' 5 Lyon County appealed
to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"), which reversed the AL's
decision regarding maintaining updated records and failure to make
available a map or diagram showing the quantity, depth, and location of
the ACWM but affirmed all other counts and reduced the total penalty to
$18,000.00.16 Unhappy with the administrative decision, Lyon County
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the EAB's decision.' 7 Lyon
County then petitioned for review in the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 8
The Eighth Circuit reviewed four key claims brought by Lyon
County. First, Lyon County claimed that the EPA did not have
jurisdiction to bring an administrative action.19 Second, the County
contended that the EPA's imposition of liability on the landfill was
inappropriate because it did not prove there were visible emissions to the
otherwise disturbing any asbestos-containing waste material that has been deposited at a
waste disposal site and is covered....
40 C.F.R. § 61.154 (2005).
13 Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 983. Asbestos-containing waste material ("ACWM")
is defined as:
[M]ill tailings or any waste that contains commercial asbestos and is generated
by a source subject to the provisions of this subpart. This term includes filters
from control devices, friable asbestos waste material, and bags or other similar
packaging contaminated with commercial asbestos. As applied to demolition
and renovation operations, this term also includes regulated asbestoscontaining material waste and materials contaminated with asbestos including
disposable equipment and clothing.
40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2005).
14 Lyon County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 983.
'15id.

16 Id.
17 Id.

1s Id.
19 Id.
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outside air or that the material investigators gathered was actually
regulated asbestos containing material ("RACM")20 or ACWM. 2 ' Third,
Lyon County argued that the EPA abused its discretion by applying its
Asbestos Removal and Demolition Policy to the landfill.2 2 Finally, Lyon
County asserted that the $18,000.00 penalty was improper because it was
based on the EPA's calculations of all of the asbestos handled by the
County rather than only the portion mishandled.2 3
Lyon County did not succeed on any of its claims.2 4 Affirming the
district court's decision in its entirety, the Eighth Circuit found that the
EPA did have jurisdiction to bring an administrative action.2 5 When
statutory language is ambiguous, the court defers to the interpretation of
the agency charged with administering the statute.26 As to Lyon County's
second claim, the court held that the EPA's imposition of liability was
correct. 27 When the record establishes that a landfill is an active waste
disposal site and inspectors can view emissions, no additional facts are
needed to show a violation of the asbestos emission standard under the
CAA. 28 Third, the court held that without a specific appendix in the
CAA's guidelines for penalties regarding active waste disposal sites, it is
not an abuse of discretion to consult the Asbestos Removal and
Regulated asbestos containing materials ("RACM") are defined as:
(a) Friable asbestos material, (b) Category I non-friable ACM that has become
friable, (c) Category I nonfriable ACM that will be or has been subjected to
sanding, grinding, cutting, or abrading, or (d) Category II nonfriable ACM that
has a high probability of becoming or has become crumbled, pulverized, or
reduced to powder by the forces expected to act on the material in the course of
demolition or renovation operations regulated by this subpart.
40 C.F.R. § 61.141.
21 Lyon County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 985. Lyon County based its second argument on the
fact that the material found could not have been the source of visible emissions because the found
material was nonfriable. Id. Nonfriable asbestos-containing material is "any material containing
more than one percent asbestos ... that, when dry, cannot be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to
powder by hand pressure." 40 C.F.R. § 61.141.
2 Lyon County Bd Of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d
at 986.
23 Id. In addition, Lyon County argued that the material would not have been subject
to regulation
if the inspectors had found it at a demolition site. Id.
24 Id. at 987.
20

2s Id. at 985.
26
27
28

Id.
Id. at 986.
id.
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Demolition Policy. 29 Finally, the court held that the penalty assessed
against Lyon County was appropriate.30 When there is potential harm
caused by mishandling asbestos, a penalty under the CAA may depend on
the total amount of asbestos involved in the operation.3 1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Administrative agencies receive deference when interpretingthe
statutory scope of theirjurisdiction
Judicial deference is traditionally given to administrative agencies
in interpreting statutes, which they are charged with administering. In
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court delineated an often-cited two-step ap roach to determine
whether an agency's interpretation should be upheld.3 First, courts must
decide whether the statutory language is clear.3 4 If there is no ambiguity,
the court announces the clear meaning of the statute.35 If the statutory
language is unclear, the court moves to the second prong of the test. In the
second prong, the court determines whether the agency's interpretation of
the statute is reasonable.3 6 As long as the interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute, the court gives deference to the
agency's interpretation.3 7
Since Chevron, many courts have held that the two-step approach
should be applied to agencies' interpretations of their own jurisdiction. 38
Recently, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Seafarers
International Union,3 9 the Fourth Circuit held that deference should be
30

Id. at 986-87.
Id. at 987.

'

Id. at 986-87.

29

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
* Id. at 842-43.
34 Id.
32

35

id.

Id. at 843.
Id. at 843-44.
38 Lyon County Bd of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 983. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Seafarers Int'l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2005), Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC,
28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
' 394 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2005).
36
3
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given to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to
delimit the bounds of its own jurisdiction. 40 EEOC brought suit alleging
that the Seafarers International Union had violated its regulation extending
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") protections to
apprenticeship programs. 4 1 In analyzing whether it was appropriate for an
agency to interpret its own authority, the court noted that the Supreme
Court has never held that Chevron deference should not apply in these
types of situations. 42 The court also noted that several court decisions
supported the application of Chevron deference. 43 Ultimately, the court
determined there was no reason to depart from granting the agency
deference." Applying Chevron, the court held that the EEOC's extension
of the ADEA to apprenticeship programs was reasonable and that it did
not contravene Congressional intent.4 5
In Coalitionfor Fairand EquitableRegulation ofDocks v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,46 the Eighth Circuit considered whether
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") had the authority to
give itself the power to regulate the use of certain lands by anyone or
whether FERC's regulatory power was limited to the land's licensee.4 7
Using the Chevron deference, the court gave substantial weight to the
FERC's interpretation of the Federal Power Act, determining that the
FERC did not exceed its authority in extending its regulatory power. 4 8
Other courts have determined that Chevron deference should not
be given to an agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction. In Midland
Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation,49 the Seventh
Circuit held that the scope of an agency's jurisdiction is a matter within the
special expertise of the courts.50 In this case, a coalmine operator's estate
sought reconsideration of a Benefits Review Board decision to deny
Id. at 201-02.
Id. at 199.
42 Id. at 201.
43 Id. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844-47 (1986) (applying
Chevron deference when an agency extended its jurisdiction to common-law counterclaims).
40

41

44Id.

Id. at 207.
297 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2002).
47 Id at 778.
48 Id. at 777-78.
49 149 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1998).
so Id. at 561.
45

46
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benefits associated with black lung disease."' The Seventh Circuit decided
that the Benefits Review Board did not have jurisdiction to hear motions
for reconsideration because "deference does not extend to the question of
judicial review, a matter within the peculiar expertise of the courts." 52
Supreme Court justices have remained divided on the issue of
whether agencies should receive deference in interpreting the limits of
their jurisdiction. In MississippiPower & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex. rel.
Moore,5 3 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained,
It is plain that giving deference to an administrative
interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction or authority is
both necessary and appropriate. It is necessary because
there is no discernible line between an agency's exceeding
its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized
application of its authority.
To exceed authorized
application is to exceed authority.
Virtually any
administrative action can be characterized as either the one
or the other, depending upon how generally one wishes to
describe the "authority." 54 And deference is appropriate
because it is consistent with the general rationale for
deference:
Congress would naturally expect that the
agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for
resolving ambiguities in its statutory authority or
jurisdiction.
Mississippi Power & Light Co. suggests that judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statutes is preferred, even in jurisdictional cases.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, argued that courts are not obligated to defer to
agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction for three reasons. 56 First,
statutes confining agencies' jurisdiction are not entrusted to agencies;
s" Id. at 560.

Id. at 561.
s 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
* See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 n.7 (1984).
Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 38 1.
56 Id. at 386.
52
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rather, they conflict with agencies' interests in expanding their own
power.
Second, agencies do not have special expertise in interpreting
statutes regarding jurisdiction.5 8 Third, Congress did not implicitly aim to
fill gaps in statutes limiting agencies' jurisdiction. 59 For these reasons,
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's decision, which determined
that giving deference to an administrative interpretation of its statutory
jurisdiction would be appropriate. 0 The disagreement within the Supreme
Court and between lower courts on this issue shows that the question of
whether agencies have the authority to interpret the statutory scope of their
jurisdiction is not yet settled.
B. Visible emissions are enough to establish a CAA violation
"Visible emissions" is a term of art which means "emissions
containing particulate asbestos material that are visually detectable
without the aid of instruments." 61 40 C.F.R. § 61.154 mandates that there
must be no visible emissions to the outside air at active waste disposal
sites. 62 All violations of 40 C.F.R. § 61.154 are violations of the CAA. 63
Still, courts have entertained disputes about what constitutes a visible
emission and exactly how much evidence is needed to establish a CAA
violation.
In United States v. Midwest Suspension and Brake,6 4 the
government brought suit against a business that rehabilitated brake shoes
for violating asbestos emissions standards under the CAA. 65 Along with
other evidence, the government presented testimony of witnesses who said
they observed a plume being discharged as a dumpster was unloaded at a
landfill.6 6 The Eastern District of Michigan held that this observance
57
58

id
Id.

59 id.
6o Id.
61 United States v. Midwest Suspension & Brake, 824 F. Supp. 713, 716 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (citing
40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (1987)).
62 40 C.F.R. § 61.154.
63 Midwest Suspension & Brake, 824
F. Supp at 729.
6 824 F. Supp 713 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
61 Id. at 716.
6 Id. at 729.
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constituted a visible emission because only the emission itself must be
visible without the aid of instruments.67 The asbestos content of an
emission does not have to be visible in order for it to constitute a visible
emission.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the visible emissions issue in United
States v. Technic Services, Inc., 69 where an asbestos remediation
corporation and its secretary were convicted of violating the CAA asbestos
emissions standards. 70 At trial, the government presented evidence of
large clouds of dust inside a building, which were caused by workers'
handling of asbestos-containing material, as well as large holes in the
walls and ceiling of the building where the dust was generated. 7' The
Ninth Circuit used the plain meaning of the term to determine that
"visible" means "capable of being seen." 72 The government did not have
to show that emissions were actually seen.7 3 Hence, testimony that
someone actually saw asbestos emissions outdoors was not required.7 4
The court upheld the convictions because it found sufficient evidence for
the jury to infer that emissions were visible in the outside air.75
Courts have loosely interpreted the CAA's mandate against visible
emissions of asbestos to the outside air. As the above cases illustrate, only
emissions, not actual asbestos content, must be visible to establish a
violation. 76 Further, a ury may infer that emissions are visible if they are
capable of being seen.
C. A CAA penaltyfor the total amount of asbestos involved in the
operation is not excessive
In assessing the appropriate penalty for CAA violations, the trend
Id. at 728-29.
Id, at 728-30.
69 314 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2002).
70 Id. at 1036.
71 Id. at 1039.
72 Id. at 1040.
73 id.
74 Id.
7 Id. at 1039.
76 See supranotes 61-74 and accompanying text.
n See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
67

61
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has been to consider both real and potential damages. In United States v.
Nevada Power Corp.,78 the court decided that it must apply the three
factors established by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm,79 when
assessing whether civil penalties for CAA violations are disproportionate
to the crimes committed.80 Following the framework laid down in Solem,
the court must
1) accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue;
2) examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the
harshness of the imposition of civil penalties; and,
[whether] the civil penalties are penal in nature, 3) compare
the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same
jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and the civil and
criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions for the
same or similar conduct. 8'
The court further explained that when determining the amount of harm
caused by a defendant's conduct, it is appropriate to take into account
whether harm was inflicted, threatened or risked.82 In Nevada Power Co.,
the court gave deference to the administrative agency to calculate the
correct penalty. 83 The court determined that the penalty was not
disproportionate to the violation because the potential harm was greater
than the realized harm. 84
In State v. Texas Pet Foods, Inc.,85 the state brought action against
No. CV-S-87-861-RDF, 1990 WL 149660 (D. Nev. 1990).
' 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
80 Nevada Power Corp., 1990 WL 149660, at *4-*5. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution forbids barbaric punishments and the imposition of sentences that are disproportionate
to the crime committed. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Solem v. Helm, the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted broad guidelines that courts may use when determining whether civil penalties are
disproportionate. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 (laying out the guidelines for determining whether a
punishment is excessive); see also Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(applying the Solem factors to damages in a civil suit).
" Nevada Power Corp., 1990 WL 149660, at *5.
78

82

id.

83 Id.
84 id.

85 591 S.w.2d 800, 802 (Tex. 1979).
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a poultry plant operator seeking assessment of monetary penalties for past
violations of the CAA. 86 At trial, the jury found that the majority of the
plant's violations concerned its operation of a sixth poultry cooker without
the required air pollution control operating permit. Texas Pet Foods, Inc.
argued that the penalties imposed were excessive because the sixth cooker
was rarely operated. The court decided that the state only had to prove
that the sixth cooker was part of the operation and that it was capable of
producing a product, not that it actually did produce it.89
As these and other cases illustrate, courts have responded
favorably to claims of CAA violations by loosely interpreting visible
emissions requirements and allowing penalties to be assessed according to
potential, as well as real, damages. Courts are divided on the issue of
whether agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting the parameters of
their own jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Lyon County decision is in line
with precedent allowing broad agency deference in enforcing the CAA.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Lyon County, the Eighth Circuit determined that the district
court was correct in granting Chevron deference to the EPA when the EPA
determined the scope of its own jurisdiction.90 Lyon County pointed out
the statutory language in 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) mandating that an
administrative action brought more than twelve months after an alleged
CAA violation was only permissible if the Administrator and Attorney
General determined that a longer period of violation was appropriate. 9 1
The County argued that the phrase "longer period of violation" meant the
violation itself must have occurred for more than twelve months in order
for the EPA to have authority. 92 The EPA argued that a "period of
violation" referred to the period from the violation's occurrence to the
administrative proceeding's commencement.9 3
The Eighth Circuit
87

Id. at 802.
Id.

8

Id. at 805.

86

89 Id.
90 Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 985.
9' Id. at 984.
92 Id.

9 Id. at 984-85.
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acknowledged that both definitions were reasonable. 94 It explained that
the Chevron doctrine orders courts to "defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering if the statute is
ambiguous, or the interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the
statute." 95 Since Congress did not clearly explain the meaning of "period
of violation" and the EPA's definition of the term was plausible, the court
gave deference to the EPA's interpretation. 96
The court rejected Lyon County's assertion that the EPA should
not receive deference in interpreting the question of its own jurisdiction.9 7
The court pointed out that other jurisdictions had allowed administrative
agencies to interpret such questions. 98 It recognized that the Eighth
Circuit had not yet adopted a rule pertaining to whether agencies should
receive deference in interpreting the scope of their own jurisdiction and
decided to align itself with the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit in
permitting such deference in the current case. 99
The court also rejected Lyon County's claim that the EPA should
not have imposed liability because the EPA did not prove there were
visible emissions or that the material investigators obtained was RACM. 00
The court first explained that it would defer to agencies' administrative
penalty decisions unless the decision involved an abuse of discretion, or
"there [was] not substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole, to
support the finding of a violation."' 01 Next, the court determined that
there was no abuse of discretion because substantial evidence, such as
tests showing that the material was RACM and was capable of emitting
visible emissions, was produced to support the EPA's finding of a
violation. 102 The court also explained that the threshold-triggering
amounts set out in 40 C.F.R. § 61.145 are not part of the requirements for
active waste disposal sites, such as the Lyon County Landfill, and
therefore, the EPA did not have to consider them in order to show a
94

Id. at 985.

95 Id. at 983 (citing Chevron, 467

U.S. at 844-45).
Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 985.
Id. at 983.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 983-84.
96
9

00 Id. at 985.

1o1Id. at 985 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (2005)).
102 Lyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 406 F.3d at 986.
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violation of the asbestos emission standard. 0 3 For these reasons, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Lyon County was
subject to liability for violating the CAA on all counts.104
After determining that Lyon County was liable, the court addressed
Lyon County's arguments that the penalty assessed against it was too
harsh. 0 5 The court dismissed the County's claim that the material found at
the landfill should not have been subject to regulation because, as
explained above, test results identified the material as RACM capable of
releasing visible emissions.' 0 6 The court also rejected the County's second
argument that the ALJ should not have applied a demolition and
renovation penalty policy to the landfill. 0 7 The court held that the AL's
application of this policy was reasonable, considering there was no
specific index related to penalties for active waste disposal sites.'0 8
Lastly, the court disagreed with Lyon County's contention that the penalty
was excessive because it was based on the total amount of asbestos at the
landfill, rather than just the amount it mishandled.109 Despite the fact that
only a small amount of asbestos were handled improperly, the court held
that a penalty under the CAA may depend on the total amount of asbestos
involved in an operation."10 The court reasoned this was due to the
considerable potential for harm caused by incorrect removal and
disposal.'''
The Eighth Circuit was not persuaded by any of Lyon County's
arguments. It concluded that the EPA's assertion of jurisdiction over the
landfill's CAA violations was correct, the EPA's imposition of liability on
the landfill was proper, and the penalty assessed against Lyon County was
appropriate.112 Therefore, it affirmed the district court's decision in its
entirety.i1'
103

id.

104

Id.

1os Id.
106
107

Id.
Id.

108

id.

10 Id.

n1o Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 987.
113 id
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V. COMMENT

The Lyon County court made two decisions that are particularly
significant in that they have the capacity to produce a host of negative
consequences. First, the court granted an administrative agency deference
in determining the statutory scope of its jurisdiction.11 4 Second, it
affirmed the assessment of a penalty disproportionate to a violator's
offense.15

The Lyon County court used the Chevron doctrine to determine
that an agency may interpret statutory language relating to the scope of its
own jurisdiction because agencies are allowed to interpret ambiguous
statutory language so long as they do so in a reasonable fashion.1 1 6
Applying Chevron to the jurisdiction issue seems rational, considering that
any interpretation is required to be reasonable. However, this decision has
the potential to create some difficulties. As the dissenting opinion in
Mississippi Power and Light Co. pointed out, statutes limiting agency
jurisdiction provide a necessary check on agencies' natural, and
undesirable, tendency to seek to expand their jurisdiction."'
This
fundamental conflict makes agencies a poor choice for interpreters of
jurisdictional provisions." 8 If agencies are given deference in determining
the scope of their own jurisdictions, they will naturally seek to expand
their authority, and the results could be problematic on countless levels.
As Justice Breyer explained in Breaking the Vicious Circle:
Toward Effective Risk Regulation, agencies often acquire tunnel vision in
carrying out their goals to the point that they accomplish more harm than
good.l9 While agencies intend to carry out tasks sensibly, their intense
focus on accomplishing particular objectives often inhibits their ability to
consider all factors, weigh alternatives, and assess collateral costs of the
stringent standards they are prone to set.' 20 Moreover, agencies have an
1 Id. at 985.
us Id. at 987.
"6 Id. at 983.

117 487
118 Id.

U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

119 sTEvEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11
(Harvard University Press 1993).
120 Id. (Breyer lists several examples of agencies' tunnel vision, one of which was
involved in
United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990)). Breyer explains,
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innate tendency to work toward expanding the scope of their authority in
order to achieve their objectives despite the fact that such expansion is
both illegitimate and troublesome for the system as a whole.
Administrative agencies' tendency to interpret their own
jurisdictional bounds expansively causes a variety of problems. For
example, overbroad interpretations of their authority could cause agencies
to intrude on the powers of other agencies, resulting in overlapping
regulations. Allowing agencies to increase their own authority in this way
could lead to confusion and a myriad of disputes over which laws govern.
The Eighth Circuit's decision to allow the EPA's penalty
calculation to stand opens the door to a variety of societal problems as
well. The court held that when there is potential harm caused by
mishandling of asbestos, a penalty under the CAA may depend on the total
amount of asbestos involved in the operation.'21 It would be possible for a
disposal site that processes an enormous amount of asbestos properly to
mishandle a miniscule amount, subjecting the site to great liability because
of the ostensible possibility of harm if all of the asbestos was mishandled.
Such a penalty conflicts with one of the fundamental tenets of the
American legal system: to be just, punishments should be proportional to
offenses.122 The instant decision presents a strong likelihood of inequity
and exposes waste disposal sites that handle asbestos to potentially
limitless liability despite the magnitude of their offenses.
There is a significant public interest in maintaining asbestos
disposal sites. Exposing them to untold liability for small infractions will
[The case arose] out of a ten-year effort to force cleanup of a toxic waste dump
in southern New Hampshire. The site was mostly cleaned up. All but one of
the private parties had settled. The remaining private party litigated the cost of
cleaning up the last little bit, a cost of about $9.3 million to remove a small
amount of highly diluted PCBs and "volatile organic compounds" (benzene and
gasoline components) by incinerating the dirt. How much extra safety did this
$9.3 million buy? The forty-thousand-page record of this ten-year effort
indicated ... that, without the extra expenditure, the waste dump was clean
enough for children playing on the site to eat small amounts of dirt daily for 70
days each year without significant harm. Burning the soil would have made it
clean enough for the children to eat small amounts daily for 245 days per year
without significant harm. But there were no dirt-eating children playing in the
area, for it was a swamp.
Id. at 11-12.
121 Lyon County Bd. ofComm'rs, 406 F.3d at 987.
122 See U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
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likely inhibit the ability of existing sites to operate, as well as decrease the
incentive to develop more disposal sites. In Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc. ,123 the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana explained
that imposing limitless liability on entities such as newspapers conflicts
with public policy goals.124 When newspaper readers brought suit for
damages against a newspaper for inaccurate reporting, the Pittman court
held, "[c]ourts seem to be sensitive to the devastating liability notion since
to ignore such arguments could have the effect of discouraging the
publication of ads dealing with valuable public information to enable
people to make informed choices."1 25 The court recognized that the public
interest served in punishing news organizations for inaccurate reporting
must be balanced against the equally important interest in allowing such
organizations to continue to disseminate information.126 Similarly, the
public interest in ensuring that RACM is properly handled must not
overwhelm the public interest in encouraging the development and
preservation of active waste disposal sites. It is crucial that such sites
continue to operate, and subjecting them to limitless liability for any
infractions, no matter how minor, discourages continued operation.
Balancing competing public interests requires limiting landfills' liability to
a degree that reflects disapproval of specific wrongdoing and does not
unjustly immobilize them.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Lyon County court confronted the multi-faceted issue of
whether the EPA should be given deference in determining the breadth of
its own jurisdiction. The Court joined other circuits and some U.S.
Supreme Court justices in determining that the EPA should receive such
deference. This decision, though well reasoned on some levels, creates the
potential for problems including illegitimate administrative agency
enlargement and overlapping regulations.
In Lyon County, the Eighth Circuit also virtually eliminated the
limits on penalty assessments against active waste disposal sites by
123
124
125
126

662 F.Supp 921 (E.D. La. 1987).
Id. at 922.
Id.
id.
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determining that penalties could be calculated based on the total amount of
asbestos the sites take in rather than just the amount they mishandle. This
holding has the potential to cause serious problems if active waste disposal
sites determine that it is not worth it for them to continue to handle
RACM. RACM must be put somewhere, and no disposal site can operate
without eventually making miniscule errors. The Lyon County holding
has the potential to emasculate the current system of asbestos disposal.
Finally, the Lyon County holding regarding the EPA's penalty
calculation disregards the American legal system's deep-seated conviction
that punishments should be proportional to crimes. It raises fundamental
issues of fairness in condoning punishment for a crime that may have, but
did not, occur.
LEAH M. CLUBB
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